CPT Gay

Marine Combat Engineers
At The 1968 Siege of Khe Sanh
The 35th Anniversary of the Start of the Siege

Story by
Bill Gay, Bruce Bell, David Critchley, Frank Kledas,
Terry Parr, John Pessoni, and Gerald Traum

This is a history of the part that 1st Platoon, A Company, 3rd Engineer Battalion (Combat), 3rd Marine Division played in the North Vietnamese Army Siege of Khe Sanh during the 1968 Tet Offensive. We had a great platoon. We are proud of what we did.

We paid heavily as many units did. At least eight members of our platoon were killed. So many were wounded that none know the final count. Several are disabled today from wounds and from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

We write this history for each other, our fallen comrades, our families, the Khe Sanh Veterans Association, at the urging of an older VA PTSD counselor who uses this history to train younger counselors when someone says they were in the Siege.

As our reasons for writing this history increased, so did its length. We added background to help all families understand Khe Sanh. As each of us remembered more, we added more details. Skip over the background information if you already know it. Smile with us as you read the personal stories. We decided that the only truth that is absolute is that each of us remembers the truth differently.

What Khe Sanh was can be succinctly defined by the titles of historical works authored by Chaplain Ray Stubbe of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines ("The Valley of Decision" and "The Final Formation"); by writer Robert Pisor ("The End of The Line - The Siege of Khe Sanh"); and combat photographer David Douglas Duncan ("I Protest").

The Khe Sanh valley and surrounding mountains were beautiful, settled by the Bru mountain tribes, Vietnamese villagers and French coffee plantations. Located in the northwest corner of Vietnam about ten kilometers from North Vietnam and Laos, the valley was an important logistics and invasion route for the North Vietnamese Army when they invaded the South.

Hundreds of US fighting men died and thousands more were wounded, as Stubbe states "because of Khe Sanh." Thousands of Bru and Vietnamese citizens and tens of thousands of NVA soldiers were killed and wounded at of Khe Sanh. The French had a combat base at Khe Sanh before 1954. Army Special Forces started operating in the area in the 1960s. Marines arrived in the mid-60s, building a combat base and defeating the NVA in the vicious fights to control the hills surrounding the Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB), what were later known as "The Hill Battles."

The US presence reached its peak in late 1967 and early 1968 when the 26th Marine Regiment held the KSCB and the Hills against attacks by two NVA Divisions. The NVA attackers probably outnumbered US defenders about 4 or 5 to 1, even though the 26th Marines were reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, all types of Marine units including l/A/3rd Engineers, Army, Air Force, Navy units, and a South Vietnamese Army Ranger Battalion.

Route 9, a single lane road, connected the larger Vietnamese cities and Marine bases in the east to Khe Sanh. It also connected Khe Sanh to Laos. The Viet Cong and NVA damaged the eastern length of the highway beyond use sometime in 1967, denying US forces the benefit of being supplied or reinforced by road. The western length of Route 9 to Laos remained open, enabling the NVA to supply and reinforce their units from the Ho Chi Minh Trail. With Route 9 cut, the Marines at the KSCB and on the Hills had to be supplied by air.

That was not too difficult when the Marine garrison numbered only about 1,000. US planes could airdrop supplies on the KSCB using radar controls from the coast near Da Nang, even when visibility fell to a matter of a few feet during the Winter Monsoon season. Supply by air became a real challenge when our strength grew to over 5,000. Supplying the Hills was a tougher job. The Hill defenders, and those who risked their lives supplying them suffered greatly.

The fiercely fought 1968 Tet Offensive started at Khe Sanh at the height of the Monsoon season. Close Air Support by fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships, and medical evacuation aircraft often could not help the defenders of Khe Sanh in those early days.

NVA artillery hit the main KSCB ammunition dump the very first time the NVA unleashed what became almost daily massive shelling attacks. The Lang Vei Army Special Forces camp near Laos and the few Marines with the Vietnamese militia in Khe Sanh village were quickly overrun by large NVA forces. NVA tanks, never before used by the NVA against US Forces, smashed through the wire at Lang Vei.

The Marines on the Hills defeated violent NVA attacks. The KSCB was also probed by NVA ground forces. With the Hills and the KSCB undefeated, the NVA used its overwhelming troop strength, artillery and rocket resources, and logistics capability to create the Siege of Khe Sanh.

The NVA relentlessly punished defenders of the hills and the KSCB with mortars, artillery, rockets, recoiless rifle fire and direct rifle fire for 77 days until early April, We all knew we could be hit at any time or crushed when an explosion collapsed a bunker or trench. Our normal human senses took on animal-like acuity. We moved like cats from one protective cover to another to minimize the chance of a being hit by a round we did not hear coming. But we heard most of them coming and tensely waited to find out if that round would wound or kill us, a friend, or a nearby stranger.

In April, the Marines broke out of the KSCB and the Hills, attacking the NVA. Many more Marines were wounded and died in these fights, part of Operation Pegasus. The 11th Engineers broke all records building about eighteen bridges and bypasses to enable Army and Marine ground forces to flood into the Khe Sanh area by road, and overland. More Marines were killed and wounded in engagements in the following months until the Marines departed in the summer of 1968. This departure permanently ended the US presence at the KSCB and on the Hills. Marine, Vietnamese, Army Special Forces and Army regular units continued to operate around Khe Sanh on a temporary basis inflicting great damage on NVA units while continuing to suffer casualties themselves.

Lightly equipped Combat Engineers such as 1st Plt A Co 3rd Engrs were always fighting alongside the Marine maneuver units. More heavily equipped Force Engineers, such as the 11th Engineer Battalion, were always working somewhere to keep supplies flowing to the Marine maneuver units.

From official government records, we know that more US bombs were dropped in defense of Khe Sanh than were dropped in some major theaters during all of World War II. Courageous Air Force and Marine cargo plane and fighter-bomber pilots and crews, and helicopter pilots and crews from all services kept our supplies, replacements, and close air support coming no matter how much NVA anti-air-craft fire was directed at them and no matter how many aircraft and men they lost.

Special US intelligence units in Thailand listened to NVA movements on sensors that a Special Navy anti-submarine warfare squadron, diverted from sea duty, dropped around us. That information helped Marine and Army artillery Forward Observers and Air Force Forward Air Controllers direct devastating fire on NVA units night and day when the NVA prepared attacks.

We recently learned from an article in Red Clay Newsletter, the Khe Sanh Veterans Inc. Magazine, that the Navy flight crews who dropped the sensors had to fly so low and slow they were decimated. Most of us crawling in Khe Sanh's red clay never knew these brave men were sacrificing themselves to help us survive.

The Joint Service effort and US technology that helped us win the Siege was impressive, but in the final analysis it was the individual Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines at Khe Sanh that held firm, enduring the worst artillery and ground attacks the NVA could deliver. Human costs were high for everyone. Stubbe recorded the names of about 600 US confirmed killed in action. The Charlie Med surgeons log shows they treated about 2,500 wounded in action.

Those numbers don't include all the wounded, and may not include all the dead evacuated directly off the Hills to the rear, the Navy fliers who perished dropping sensors, the pilots and aircrews from all Services shot down, the Special Forces and CIA operatives killed in Laos and North Vietnam while directing fire on NVA reinforcements heading for Khe Sanh, and others that we are just learning about. If we knew who all of those warriors were, the total of US warriors lost at Khe Sanh would be much higher.

Additionally, thousands of innocent Bru mountain tribe members and Vietnamese civilians were murdered by the NVA when the NVA swept into the area. US firepower probably killed many more of those that could not escape the area when we started bombing, or chose to stay in their ancestral homes. Official estimates of NVA casualties around Khe Sanh are about 15,000. Thousands more NVA died on the Ho Chi Minh Trail carrying supplies to the two reinforced NVA Divisions surrounding Khe Sanh.

The once green landscape around Khe Sanh became a barren moonscape from US bombs and US and NVA artillery. Huge amounts of Agent Orange herbicide was sprayed and has ruined the lives of many fighters and civilians on both sides. We've learned that tactical nuclear weapons were positioned for use in case US forces at Khe Sanh were in real danger of falling. Anyone who knows the terrain at Khe Sanh knows that everyone in the area on both sides would have suffered badly if tactical nuclear weapons had been used.

Khe Sanh was declared one of the most significant battles of the Vietnam War. We now know that President Johnson had a scale model of Khe Sanh in the White House and was briefed almost daily on our ability to hold. It would be years before we personally understood the significance of having survived Khe Sanh. Khe Sanh was mostly just red clay to us. We saw it from a few inches off the ground. While we were there, we doubt any of us thought of Khe Sanh's strategic significance. For their dedicated efforts the defenders of Khe Sanh were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, which is equivalent to the Navy Cross, if it were an individual award.

After the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975, the NVA erected a victory monument at Khe Sanh attesting to the importance of Khe Sanh to their side. Today, the NVA monument is viewed by international tourists visiting the battlefields. Tourists unfamiliar with the many battles at Khe Sanh may believe the NVA victory claims. The US and Vietnamese forces who fought there know the truth: We won.

By military doctrine, one Combat Engineer Platoon normally supports one Infantry Battalion. We contribute our expertise with demolitions. We also have pioneer tool chests with axes, shovels, and chain saws. Marine Engineers normally leave these at a base camp.

Combat Engineers carry the same weapons and ammunition as the Infantry. Every Engineer also carries two or more twenty-pound Satchel Charges of explosives. The joke is that a Marine Combat Engineer is really only "a grunt with a satchel charge."

Our Combat Engineer Platoon, l/A/3, supported the entire Khe Sanh Combat Base. By doctrine, this mission normally would be assigned to a reinforced Combat Engineer Company, a force about five times larger than our platoon and much better equipped.

We were faced with doing the best we could with the meager resources we had. We radioed our company in Dong Ha once a day to report our dead and wounded and plead for replacements and supplies, but few came. We became more exhausted as our casualties mounted, but we never stopped working.

Exhausted men doing a great deal with few resources was the normal state of most support units at Khe Sanh. None of us were going to let anyone down on the KSCB, or on the Hills. In late Fall 1967, our platoon had less than twenty members. We sent teams on 1/26 operations, did mine sweeps and civic action projects in the village, blasted rock for the Seabees to use to improve the runway and roads and operated the KSCB water point. Life was not very dangerous, then.

Battle-weary Engineer veterans such as Cpl Gerald Traum, who fought in the fierce 1967 Hill fights, completed their tours and left for "The World." The rest of us recording this history were arriving. After Thanksgiving 1967, our platoon strength increased to over forty. We knew a big fight was coming, but we had no idea that fight would become the Siege.

Another Combat Engineer Platoon from C Company, 3rd Engineer Battalion arrived about the time the Siege started. We were so busy, we seldom saw them, and strangely, none of us recall what they did. We hope someone records their story. We know they must have been as busy as we were. Captain Bert Ranta arrived to coordinate all Engineer work with the regimental staff. Ranta lived with our platoon in a bunker with 2/Lt. Bill Gay and our platoon sergeant, S/Sgt Ronald C. Sniegowski.

From then on we cleared acres of fields of fire, built hundreds of meters of barbed wire fences, planted hundreds of booby traps and mines, retrieved tons of air dropped supplies that drifted into the minefields, cleared many dead NVA from the minefields, built bunkers, and miraculously kept the water point flowing. We also served as listening posts and reinforced perimeter positions at night.

We worked every day and almost every night in small teams. We seldom knew if our teams had a good or bad day until we returned to our bunkers. That is when we found out about our losses for the day. Some evenings were joyous and some sad. We were only with the units we supported for a short time before we moved on to another mission. Some units never realized we were Combat Engineers. This is why it is so important for Engineers to stay in touch. We were not part of a big family support group like an Infantry Company.

In the fall of 1967 most of the perimeter around the KSCB did not have cleared fields of fire or good protective barbed wire fencing. In December 1967, Lt.Gay was talking to 1/Lt. Tim Reeves on the regimental staff about how the perimeter could be improved. Reeves took Gay to talk to Col Lownds about what could be done. Within a day Lownds ordered the Seabees to provide earth moving equipment to help us clear fields of fire, and ordered several Infantry Platoons to work with us to build new barbed wire fences.

The new fences, looking from the enemy side inward, consisted of a high double apron, then a wide empty space to prevent NVA Sappers (i.e., their combat engineers) from breeching more than one fence at a time. An extra wide belt of tangle foot fence, another wide empty space, a triple concertina fence, and another wide empty space before reaching the Marine trenches. Everyone worked hard. The Seabees welded pipes to the sledge hammer heads to replace the broken wooden handles we broke at record rates. We placed empty artillery shell canisters over the fence pickets to create a bigger target for the hammers. Everyone innovated. This Infantry, Engineer Team effort dramatically changed the KSCB perimeter in a few days. The vegetation that once came up almost to the old broken wire was removed. In its place was bare red clay and formidable fencing. The new perimeter protected most of the KSCB and the Special Forces FOB trench lines before the Siege started.

After the start of the Siege, it was too dangerous to clear fields of fire with the Seabee equipment. We did it by hand, burning grass with unused artillery powder bags, and cutting down trees with demolitions. We continued to help the Vietnamese Rangers, 1/9, and 3/26 improve their perimeters while they did a lot by themselves. We wanted very much to help the Hills, but there were not enough of us to be sent there too. We were proud of how much our efforts improved the KSCB perimeter.

Before the Siege, the only type of mines protecting the perimeter was the highly effective Claymore placed by the grunts. But they would not have been enough if wave after wave of NVA attacked. We added hundreds of "Bouncing Betty" and "Shoe Polish Can" anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, and innovative booby traps. Our booby traps were made to look like fencing material we left behind in the typical manner of US troops who had too much material. However each of those partially used rolls of barbed wire or abandoned steel stakes was booby trapped and set to explode if an NVA tried to crawl or charge through the fencing. At first, we were able to use the cover of the monsoon fog to hide us when we placed mines. When the weather cleared we had to crawl around in the daylight, or, wait to place the mines at night to avoid NVA fire.

We were often shot at by NVA recoilless rifles and mortars. We never understood why NVA snipers did not kill us one at a time. We expected they would start picking us off one by one any day, which made placing the mines even more stressful. We recorded many of the minefield layouts on cardboard C-ration case covers because we did not have minefield recording sheets. In many cases we paced off the distance between mines by moving on our hands and knees to avoid being shot at or mortared while standing.

We did all this with only one compass that we guarded carefully. When Lt. Gay was wounded he held tightly to that compass even while being treated at Charlie Med, until he could pass it on to Sgt. Sniegowski. If that compass was off, anyone entering the minefields with another compass was at risk. Over the years, we've had the chance to talk to Marine and Army troops that used our minefield recording sheets. We are proud to say that whenever the sheets could be found they were found to be accurate preventing US casualties. Sadly there were many situations where the recording sheets were not found and troops were wounded in our minefields.

We had lots of close calls in the minefields. Once, one our squads found themselves in a maze of grenade and trip wire booby traps the ARVN Rangers placed without telling anyone. While extracting themselves, they crawled through the human waste the Rangers routinely left in front of their positions. We decided that pushing Bouncing Betty mine detonation prongs through a piece of human waste was another good way to fool NVA Sappers, so we added it to our list of camouflage tricks from that day forward.

Many other close calls came as we armed hundreds, if not thousands of mines. We found many old ones from World War II and the Korean War to be in poor condition. We tried to "get the word out" every time we found a problem or a solution because we knew the grunts on the Hills were placing their own mines. Other terrifying close calls came when air dropped supplies would miss the drop zone and land in the minefields. Sometimes we only had to carry the supplies out of the minefields. Other times we would stand frozen in a partially finished minefield as parachutes with tons of palletized supplies came rushing out of the fog. It was a miracle that those pallets did not set off a mine near us or crush any of us.

Many NVA Sappers were surprised and killed by our booby traps as they tried to infiltrate at night, especially in front of the ARVN Rangers. The NVA would have taken heavy losses if our artillery and air power did not stop all of the full-scale attacks they tried to mount against the KSCB. It was gruesome and scary going back in to our minefields to get the NVA bodies out because they were mangled and we knew any mine near the one they set off was now super sensitized. But going in to get their bodies out became a regular task.

Shortly before the NVA ground attacks started and after much work on the new fields of fire and protective fences was finished, an NVA recon patrol, including senior officers, risked taking a personal look at the new perimeter. They were discovered and killed trying to escape. As they retreated, one NVA Officer stayed behind and hid. After a few days, he surrendered to the Engineers as we placed mines on the perimeter. We turned him over to the grunts and kept working. His information caused Hill units to attack the NVA while the NVA was moving into position to attack the Hills. A good part of the NVA battle plan must have been changed by the Marines taking the initiative and attacking first.

Imagine what would have happened if the new perimeter had not concerned the NVA so much that they felt they had to try their daring reconnaissance patrol, enabling an NVA officer with so much knowledge of the coming attacks to defect and warn us? Also imagine what would have happened if the few ground attack probes the NVA did try against the KSCB were not so restricted by all the new fields of fire, fences, and minefields?

When the NVA artillery attacks started on 21 January 1968, the Engineers immediately went to work clearing shells blown out of the ammo dump onto the airstrip. It was a hectic morning filled with CS tear gas, confusion from enemy fire and secondary explosions. We know there were EOD personnel on the KSCB, but we can not remember working with them that day. There was just so much to do that everybody just did what was needed without formal coordination. We did our part to get the airstrip opened, to get casualties out and keep supplies coming in.

Before the Siege, many units at the KSCB lived in tents on wooden platforms surrounded by 55 gallon drums filled with dirt and topped with sandbags to create protective walls. After the first day of the Siege, everyone wanted to live completely underground in bunkers. Fortunately, we always lived in bunkers. Before the Siege, friends from other units joked about our damp, dark, cramped bunkers. After the Siege started, everyone envied us. Throughout the Siege, we built some bunkers but mostly, according to military doctrine, we trained people to build them themselves. That was a way to get everyone building.

The Fire Direction Center (FDC) bunker we built for 1/13 was the biggest bunker we built. It is an amusing story. None of us were trained to build large bunkers. We were trained to blow up bunkers, tunnels, and bridges. After brainstorming we ended up using the Seabee equipment to dig a large slit trench over which we built a bridge strong enough to carry a tank. Then, we covered it.

We put empty artillery canisters upside down on the bunker to create a "burster layer." A burster layer detonates a round above an empty space, dissipating the explosion instead of focusing it on the bunker structure. In this case, the NVA rounds exploded when they hit the canister tops, dissipated the blast into the empty shell casings. We got the word out about this use of empty 105 canisters. Soon, almost everyone was making their bunkers stronger with "burster layers." That saved a lot of lives.

Our burster layer solution was real personal. One of our bunkers took a direct hit. Thanks to the burster layer only a support beam split. The bunker did not cave in � that could have killed or wounded many of us. We emerged shaken but alive and started building double and triple burster layers.

Our success in keeping the KSCB supplied with water was a miracle. We can't believe the NVA didn't target the KSCB water supply. They probably never thought that a reinforced Regiment would depend on a water source located outside of its perimeter and not under its control all the time. The water point was set up sometime in early 1967 outside the eventual KSCB perimeter. This was probably done when the Marines thought they would just be there temporarily.

We had to pump water up from a stream located in a gully on the north side of the perimeter. The NVA could have diverted or contaminated our water source since the stream flowed from terrain the NVA held. The pump had to be hauled down to the stream to pump water up to fill storage bladders.

We drew a lot of mortar fire doing that. They could have ambushed us and destroyed the pump every time we rolled it down the hill to pump water up. To our amazement, even though the NVA routinely hit us with recoilless rifle fire when we worked in the minefields, they never ambushed us when we hauled the pump out. They never had a sniper take us out, even though we had to haul the pump out once every few days.

We may have survived because we hauled the pump at such great speed that we surprised everyone. One day we narrowly escaped a napalm drop by the Air Force near the pump site, because the FAC didn't know we were out there. The pipe from the pump up to the bladders was often punctured. During one especially long afternoon and night, we had to figure out how to create a whole new pipeline from damaged pieces. How we solved that unique problem is hilariously funny to explain now. It wasn't funny then. We were being mortared almost the whole time we were crawling around fixing the pipeline. The bladders and purification equipment were damaged daily. We could write a book about the innovative ways we repaired them. Before long, we were patching the patches.

An Engineer Lance Corporal (we think his name was Shipman) kept the water point operating. He is one of Khe Sanh's many unsung, unglamorous heroes. He was always working in wet torn clothes. He also always sported a few bandages from small shrapnel wounds for which he didn't feel he should receive a Purple Heart. Shipman is one of many that deserves an award but never got one. We all just thought we were just doing our job. If Shipman's name was Christman, he died with one of our other platoon members, PFC Emmett Stanton, when the chopper they were on was shot down on 28 February. Stanton and Christman are both listed as "unit unknown" on the KSV Memorial List. Being killed and unidentified was the lot that befell Engineers, since we were attached to larger units and not always accurately counted in the confusion of combat.

Most of us at Khe Sanh didn't even know Stanton was killed until years later. Until we hear otherwise, we will place Christman among our honored fallen, rather than leave him listed as "unit unknown." He had an MOS that was related to the 350 GPM fuel pump that was cleaned and used to pump water to the KSCB.

PFC Delano arrived to replace Christman to keep the water point going. He was soon killed by shrapnel. Who would have ever thought running a water point could be so dangerous? Imagine what Khe Sanh would have been like if we had to run patrols down to the stream to get cans of water instead of pumping it up at 350 gallons a minute, or worse yet, if we had to fly water in because the NVA diverted the stream or simply dumped a few of their decaying dead in the stream everyday?

Ray Stubbe in a recent article in Red Clay quoted World War II studies that found that as many as 90% of combatants exposed to continual combat for over 60 days suffer some form of battle fatigue. That wouldn't surprise us, especially when you add the effects of our horrendous living conditions to our constant exposure to danger. Our normal physical condition was one of continual stress from being exposed to danger and to the loss of our comrades, sleep deprivation, hunger bordering on malnutrition, and incredible body filth because we had only enough water to drink.

Our bunkers were alone at the northeast end of the airstrip, across the road from a 1/13 artillery battery. Being alone was good because we could keep our area clean thus controlling the never ending battle with the rats infesting all the bunkers on the KSCB.

Other units had to evacuate personnel because of rat bites. That never happened to us. The bad news about our bunker locations was the incessant artillery fire directly over us night and day. The out-going, added to the constant enemy incoming, made it hard for those of us not helping the grunts man the perimeter at night to get any sleep.

Our isolated position at the end of the airstrip also made it necessary for us to man guard positions around our own area. It would have been easy for an NVA Sapper to drop a satchel charge in our bunkers if one had ever penetrated the perimeter. Between the physically exhausting workload everyday and the perimeter or guard duty we had every night, we probably were much more severely sleep deprived than we ever imagined. Getting basic supplies was also a challenge. Engineers, like other support units at KSCB that operated in a quasi-orphan status without a parent organization often had to scrounge what we needed. Some of our exploits sound like they were written for MASH, the TV Show.

We would trade C4 plastic explosives, which could be burned to heat C-rations, for canned fruit and other goodies that we couldn't get as an independent platoon. Finding an onion was always a special treat that resulted in us all combining our C-rations in a large can to create a "hobo stew" which broke the monotonous taste of the C-rations. We would position a few daring souls to pop up as soon as NVA incoming stopped to go over the fences into the food storage areas and throw out a few cases of fruit or something else good to eat. Most of us lost ten pounds or more before we left Khe Sanh because we only received one, maybe two rations a day even though we worked hard. We suffered varying degrees of malnutrition and vitamin deficiencies. We were just young men, almost all of us under 21 and still growing. We were always hungry.

Our clothes or boots rotted off our bodies, or were torn to shreds in the barbed wire, so we posted an Engineer at Charlie Med to bring us clothing or more M-16 magazines thrown out by the corpsman after they evacuated the wounded and dead. Having to haul heavy loads of mines and other materials was always a problem. Due to constant exposure, it wasn't long before all of our equipment and our only truck were hit so many times by NVA shrapnel that they could not be repaired. This led to our biggest "heist" � a jeep and trailer. We jumped in and drove off with it after the occupants of the jeep jumped out to take cover during incoming. No one remembers the rightful owners ever reclaiming the jeep. We hope that occurred only because of the confusion at the KSCB and not because the original occupants were wounded and evacuated. Life was not easy for anyone at the KSCB. It was hard for us as an independent unit, but we had it many times better than the Marines on the Hills. We'll never forget them. We worked harder on the KSCB, because we knew we were indirectly helping the Hills.

Our platoon was exposed every day and most nights to some type of direct or indirect NVA fire. We tried to be careful and not draw attention to ourselves. We also were fanatical about wearing our protective flak vests and helmets. We tried desperately to get protective shorts but couldn't. Most of our causalities occurred one at a time, but we had a few days when we took heavy losses. One day laying mines for 1/9, four Engineers and five grunts were wounded by recoilless rifle fire. Cpl Claus Berg heard about the losses after working all day on the 1/26 perimeter. His squad immediately came out to help us finish the 1/9 minefield. We all made our way back to the main KSCB together under cover of darkness. On 8 March, Lt. Gay, LCpl Clyde Phillips, and our doc (we think his name was Johnson) were standing by our bunkers talking to Jurate Kazickas, a freelance female reporter working for WOR Radio. She was interviewing Marines from New York City. The NVA got lucky that day. Random NVA artillery rounds wounded all three Engineers and Jurate. Moore was killed a few days later, while attempting to bring hot meals up to our platoon.

Each Engineer, like every other person at Khe Sanh, could write a book about their personal experiences and how those experiences shaped their lives. LCpl John Pessoni came to Khe Sanh after going through the worst of the Con Thien battles. He stood out because he was very tall and because he always helped everyone. Pessoni, Phillips, and LCpl Oilie Olsen were part of a team that never stopped working. One day, a Marine tank crew saved Pessoni and Phillips. They were pinned down by an NVA recoilless rifle who caught them working on a forward slope where they were helping a unit booby trap fugas. Fugas was a mixture of jellied gasoline in a barrel that was pushed out from behind by a shaped charge when fired. It is harrowing being pinned down anywhere. It is especially harrowing being pinned down while rigging a booby trap.

Another day Pessoni, Phillips and PFC Upton, who usually supported 1/9 and 3/26 found themselves in a firefight in the 1/9 area. The grunt Gunny Sergeant showing them what he wanted done was wounded. They helped evacuate the Gunny as the jets swooped close in dropping napalm on the tree line from which the NVA were firing. It was Pessoni who later evacuated Lt. Gay, Philips, Doc Johnson, and Kazickas to Charlie Med. PFC Hewlett was killed standing next to PEC Terry Parr as they walked across the base coming back from a mission. Parr wasn't scratched. Such unexplainable events happened daily filling us with fear, relief, and guilt.

Parr was a Fire Team leader even though only a PFC. Everyone who could promote him was wounded and evacuated before ordering the promotion. In April, Parr was promoted on the spot by Capt. Bill Nye, the A Company Commander, who was finally able to get to Khe Sanh for the first time. Like so many others, Parr always did his job � and then some. He knew that everything the Engineers did affected many lives. PFC Patrick was killed when our last vehicle was hit transporting supplies. LCpl David Critchley, who normally drove the truck and operated the radio, was spared that day. As our driver and radioman, Critchley was a critical member of the platoon and always on the move. This resulted in him giving much unplanned support to units he encountered. David Critchley and Bill Gay ended up in a Life magazine photo taken during one of Critchley's unplanned assistance stops. They pulled two injured Air Force pilots out of a smoldering observation plane that crashed inside the KSCB. On the day Critchley left KSCB, he dove onto the cargo ramp of one of the last C-123s to land and still be able to take off from Khe Sanh. The crew chief dragged Critchley inside as the plane lifted off through a hailstorm of NVA mortar rounds.

Sgt. Sniegowski and Lt. Gay were with Doctor Ed Feldman and HM2 Tilletson from Charlie Med when he removed a mortar round from the stomach of a wounded Marine. They examined the Marine with Feldman and advised Feldman on how to handle the round. Feldman and Sniegowski went in alone to remove it, to minimize casualties in case it exploded while being extracted. Feldman became a close friend that day and remains one today. Ski was a great Platoon Sergeant. For their heroic actions, Ed Feldman received the Silver Star and Ron Sniegowski, the Bronze Star.

Sniegowski and Gay only argued once. Ski believed it was important to have "green" Engineer replacements clear the NVA bodies out the minefields. He believed this battle hardened them so they wouldn't panic when they got into their first tough situation. Gay felt that was too gruesome for new arrivals to do. After seeing the positive effect of that tough training, Gay decided Ski was right. Not everyone could take the stress. We've struggled to remember the names of more members of our platoon. We recall LCpl Kilroy, who replaced Critchley as radio operator. We also remember Lance Corporals Hrbrich, Lincoln and Fontez, Corporals Bell, Blankie, Ice, and Williams, and a Sergeant Hudson, who after serving two tours in Vietnam, died years later auto racing.

We worked hard. We made a difference. All we could think about was that everything we did on the KSCB also helped the Marines fighting on the Hills. We were not about to let anyone down. Our efforts, the improved perimeter, the minefields and booby traps, the bunkers, the water point, and the help we were able to give to what seemed like a million units, saved lives and helped win the Siege. When the Marines started going after the retreating NVA in April 1968 on Operation Pegasus, the Engineers were again attached as demolition teams. Cpl Kledas and LCpl Richards were wounded while 1/9 was getting ready to move out. They disregarded their wounds and went on the operation as scheduled. A few days later, Pfc Phelps stopped an NVA assault on their position and was KIA while helping wounded Marines. For his galantry, he was awarded the Bronze Star Medal. There is a wing of the combat engineers Instruction company barracks at Camp Lejeune named in his honor We were unaware of this until Bruce Bell was located and informed us that he had visited Phelps's family when he returned to the States and learned of the honor bestowed on Randall Phelps.

In June 1968, the surviving members of 1/A/3rd Engrs left Khe Sanh with elements of the 26th Marines to operate further south near Danang until they finished their tours in Vietnam. We don't remember the racial, ethnic, or religious composition of our platoon. We were just young citizens that fought together, cared for each other, and went on to live our lives. Some of us stayed on active service and were able to talk about our experiences with other military men who understood. Most of our platoon went home in anonymity to a public that did not understand or respect what we did until many years later. Each of us has had to find our own way to deal with the insanity that was Khe Sanh.

After thirty years, members of our Platoon started to meet again because of the wonderful Khe Sanh Veterans Association (KSVA) and its successful efforts to include everyone. David Critchley, Bill Gay, Frank Kledas, Terry Parr and John Pessoni were united in 2001 through the KSVA. Most have attended a KSVA reunion. Gerald Traum was the first to join the KSVA but was only found by his platoon mates in 2002 when he placed a memorial to A/T Engineers in Red Clay. Ed Feldman found Bill Gay through professional friends in 2000 and signed Bill up as a KSVA member that very night.

Jurate Kazickas was also reunited with us through the KSVA. Kazickas and eight other pioneering female reporters from Vietnam have just published a book of remembrances entitled "War Torn" Her Chapter focuses on her times at Khe Sanh and her being wounded with the engineers. Bruce Bell found her book on Jan 21 2003 and learned Bill Gay and Zazickzs had survived. He called them and subsequently found the rest of the platoon.

We are indebted to Ray Stub be for starting the KSVA and for pressing us to add our unit history to others already on record with the KSVA. We are also indebted to those Veterans who donate their time to make the KSVA, an organization that includes everyone.

David Critchley served the Federal Government for 36 years. He retired with honors from the Defense Information Systems Agency. At his retirement celebration, attended by a huge number of his colleagues, his many accomplishments were summarized. When Dave made his comments, he chose to remember Khe Sanh first. Bill Gay was fortunate enough to be a guest at the celebration. Dave lives near Pensacola, EL.

Terry Parr went home to York, PA, working for years for Caterpillar Tractor. After struggling alone, he recently sought help for post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). His VA counselor called to tell us Terry did not feel he could ask us for help because some of us were wounded and he wasn't. We are all now helping Terry. Dr. Ed Feldman volunteered too. Dr. Feldman lives near Los Angeles, CA.

John Pessoni went home to New York City. He worked for years with Otis Elevator. Gerald Traum chose to live remotely in Northern California. They both have 100% PTSD disability. They both talk with strong feelings about the members of the platoon and the work we did to help win the Siege. John lives in Toms River, NJ. Gerry lives in Hayfork, CA.

Bruce Bell went from Vietnam to Quantico where he was a starter of the Marine Corps football team. He returned home to Annapolis, MD where he worked as a certified fitness instructor.

Frank Kledas completed a distinguished career in the Marines, retiring as a First Sergeant. Frank is now an instructor at the Colorado School of Trades Gunsmithing School and is a small business owner in Denver, CO.

Bert Ranta was last heard of living in Australia, where he emigrated after leaving the Marines.

Bill Gay saw Ronald Sniekowski once at Camp Pendleton but has been unable to locate him again and wishes he could.

Bill Gay was hospitalized for over a year from wounds received at Khe Sanh. He was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for his heroic actions at Khe Sanh. Col. Lownds helped Bill make an inter-service transfer to the Army Corps of Engineers. Bill completed a military career dedicated to making sure young troops would never again be put in a situation like Khe Sanh. Bill works in the Information Technology business and lives in Great Falls, VA.

The history of the Khe Sanh battles is a remarkable collection of thousands of personal stories of exceptional service, sacrifice and hardship. We are proud to add our history to all the others. As we find more Engineers with whom we served, we'll update our story. Until then, Semper Fidelis and God Bless America from: The Veterans of 1ST Platoon, A Company, 3rd Engineer Battalion, 1967-2003.

PATRICK, ALBERT EARL
CHRISTMAN, RONALD S
STANTON, EMMETT CHARLES
MOORE, LEWIS WAYNE
DELANO, JIMMY LYNN
HOWLETT NORMAN L JR
PHELPS. RANDALL CARL
CRICKENBERGER, RICHARD V
FAULKNER, ELMER LEE JR.

PFC
CPL
PFC
PFC
L/CPL
L/CPL
PFC
PFC
PFC

KIA 14 FEB 1968
KIA 28 FEB 1968
KIA 28 FEB 1968
KIA 10 MAR 1968
KIA 13 MAR 1968
KIA 30 MAR 1968
KIA 08 APR 1968
KIA 26 MAY 1968
KIA 18 JUN 1968

Bronze Medal Citation for PFC Phelps

For heroic achievement in connection with, operations against the. enemy in the. Republic of Vietnam while serving as. a. Combat Engineer with Company C, First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third. Marine. Division. On the night of 3 April 1968 Private First Class PHELPS's unit was occupying a position on Hill 477' near. the Khe Sanh Combat Base. when the company was attacked by estimated North Vietnamese Battalion. Despite heavy, enemy fire and white phosphorous grenades, exploding around him, he .delivered effective fire against a squad of enemy soldiers attacking his position, halting, their advance. Steadfastly maintaining his position, he, continued to. Deliver accurate fire until the attackers were forced to break contact and flee.

On 8 April 1968, his unit's position on hill 689 came Under an intense enemy mortar barrage. Despite the continuing hostile .fire- and in an effort to expedite the: evacuation. Of casualties. Private First Class PHELPS assisted in embarking wounded Marines, aboard helicopters-for medical, evacuation and 'was subsequently mortally wounded. Private First Class PHELPS's courage, initiative and selfless devotion to '.duty, despite extreme personal danger, were in keeping with the highest-traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the service of his country.

The Combat "V" is authorized.

The Maintenance Complex in 1973

Captain Gay in Vietnam

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